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This article is the first of two whose goal is to advance the discussion of IS risk by addressing 
limitations of the current IS risk literature. These limitations include: 
• inconsistent or unclear definitions of risk,  
• limited applicability of risk models,  
• frequent omission of the temporal nature of risk, and  
• lack of an easily communicated organizing framework for risk factors.  
This article presents a general, but broadly adaptable model of system-related risk. The 
companion article, Volume 14, Article 2[Sherer and Alter, 2004]  focuses on IS risk factors and 
how these factors can be organized.  
This article starts by identifying criteria for a general, but broadly applicable risk model. It 
compares alternative conceptualizations of risk and provides clarifications of the definitions of risk 
and of different treatments of goals, expectations, and baselines for assessing risk. It presents 
several of the risk models in the IS literature and discusses the temporal nature of risk.  
Based on that background it presents a general and broadly adaptable model of risk that 
encompasses: 
• goals and expectations,  
• risk factors and other sources of uncertainty,  
• the operation of the system or project whose risks are being managed, 
• the risk management effort,  
• the possible outcomes and their probabilities,  
• impacts on other systems,  
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• and the resulting financial gains or losses.  
The model’s adaptability allows users to eliminate facets that are not important for their purposes. 
For example, the majority of current practitioners would probably think of risk in terms of negative 
outcomes rather than the full distribution of possible outcomes.  A comparison of the general 
model with other risk models in the IS literature shows that it covers most of the ideas expressed 
by previous IS risk models while also providing a practical approach that managers can use for 
thinking about IS risk at whatever level of detail makes sense to them. 
Keywords: information systems risk, risk factors, risk components, risk model, risk management, 
work system, project risk, software risk, work system framework, success factors, emergent risks 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This article is the first of two whose goal is to advance the discussion of IS risk. The article 
presents a general, but broadly adaptable model of system-related risk.  The model applies both 
to information systems in operation and projects aimed at creating or improving information 
systems. The second article [Sherer and Alter, 2004] discusses the risk components and many 
risk factors in the IS literature. It shows how the risk factors can be organized to make them more 
accessible and more easily communicated to business managers.   
This article starts by identifying criteria for a general, but broadly applicable risk model. It 
compares alternative conceptualizations of risk and provides clarifications related to definitions of 
risk, different treatments of goals, expectations, and baselines for assessing risk. It mentions 
several of the risk models in the IS literature and discusses the temporal nature of risk. Based on 
that background it presents a general and broadly adaptable model of risk that encompasses: 
• Goals and expectations 
• Risk factors and other sources of uncertainty 
• Temporal relationships between goals, initial risk factors, emergent  
risk factors, and management goals and decisions  
• Operation of the system or project whose risks are being managed 
• Risk management and abatement activities 
• Possible outcomes and their probabilities 
• Impacts on other systems 
• The resulting financial gains or losses. 
The model’s adaptability allows users to eliminate facets that are not important for their purposes. 
For example, the most general version of the model is based on the viewpoint of the decision 
science literature, and views risk as the probability distribution of outcomes, both positive and 
negative. An alternative, slightly less general model is presented that reflects the way most of the 
IS literature views risk in terms of negative outcomes relative to management goals and 
expectations. Omission of positive outcomes from the risk model is only one of many possible 
adaptations to meet different analysis needs of different users. A comparison of these two models 
with other risk models in the IS literature shows that these two models cover most of the ideas 
expressed by previous IS risk models while also providing a practical approach that managers 
can use for thinking about IS risk at whatever level of detail makes sense to them. 
II. THE NEED FOR MORE CLARITY ABOUT INFORMATION SYSTEM RISK 
Our attempt to develop a general, but readily adaptable model of information system risk was 
motivated by the results of a survey of the IS risk literature. Attempting to represent the 
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reasonably recent literature rather than covering the hundreds of articles directly or indirectly 
related to IS risk, our literature survey focused on three journals consistently ranked among the 
best IS research journals (MISQ, ISR, and JMIS) and selected articles starting in 1986 whose title 
included the word risk or whose abstract focused on risks in system projects or operation. We 
supplemented this group of articles with other risk-related articles that we believed were 
significant based on our knowledge of the literature. In total we included 46 articles. We believe 
these articles are a good representation of the literature.  Appendix I categorizes these articles in 
terms of  
• definition of risk,  
• model or approach used,  
• type of system or project (which reflects different stages of the software life cycle 
and some aspects of the temporal nature of risk), and  
• number and type of risk variables.    
The general conclusion from our literature survey is that the IS risk literature is a jumble of 
diverse risk models and partially overlapping, atheoretical lists of risk factors and risk 
components. This article addresses one shortcoming of the literature, the lack of a practical 
model that most managers can use for understanding IS-related risks at whatever level of detail is 
appropriate for them. Our companion article [Sherer and Alter, 2004] focuses on risk factors and 
delves further into the literature’s coverage of risk components and risk factors. 
To introduce ideas needed for a broadly adaptable risk model, this section provides clarifications 
related to conceptualizations of risk and different treatments of goals, expectations, and baselines 
for assessing risk. It refers to some of the risk models in the IS literature and discusses the 
temporal nature of risk. 
 Before discussing those ideas it is worthwhile to consider criteria that a general, yet broadly 
adaptable risk model should satisfy: 
• Clarity: The model should be based on clearly defined concepts. 
• Practicality of use: The model’s use of concepts should be understandable to typical 
business professionals. It should provide rigor by organizing a risk analysis, but should 
not sacrifice practicality and efficiency for mathematical purity. In particular, it should not 
force users to provide data they find unintuitive or untrustworthy. 
• Completeness: The model should encompass key issues that business and IT 
professionals care about. Omitting issues that users care about will make it less 
applicable to the situations in which it is needed. 
• Adaptability: The model should be adaptable to the user’s situation and interests. Users 
should feel free to include or exclude specific components of the model, but should be 
aware of both advantages and disadvantages of such omissions. 
Our search of the existing IS risk literature found no risk models that we believe satisfy these four 
conditions.  We found some models that address the needs of professional software developers, 
but none that we believe are truly practical for use by business professionals, complete in the 
issues that business professionals care about, and readily adaptable by users who may not be 
interested in all of the possible facets of a very general model.   
CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF RISK 
The term risk has various meanings in everyday life. For example, definitions of risk provided by 
www.dictionary.com include: 
• The possibility of suffering harm or loss; danger.  
• A factor, thing, element, or course involving uncertain danger; a hazard 
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• For an insurer, the danger or probability of loss or the amount an insurance company 
stands to lose.  
• In terms of variability: the variability of returns from an investment or the chance of 
nonpayment of a debt.  
• A person or thing as a risk, such as a person considered a poor risk. 
The IS risk literature uses several different conceptualizations of risk. Table 1 summarizes the 
distribution of risk conceptualizations in the 46 articles selected from the IS risk literature. Most of 
these conceptualizations focus on negative occurrences and fall into three categories: (1) risk 
components, (2) risk factors, and (3) probability of negative outcomes.       
Table 1. Conceptualizations of Risk in 46 IS Risk Articles 
Conceptualization of Risk Number of articles 
Risk components: different types of negative outcomes  11 
Risk factors leading to loss or source of risk factors 11 
Risk as probability of negative outcomes (sometimes weighted by loss) 15 
Risk as difficulty in estimating outcome 2 
Risk undefined or discussed using a different term such as problem or threat  7 
Risk as Risk Components, Different Types of Negative Outcomes 
The first conceptualization identifies different types of negative outcomes, such as project risk 
(failure to complete a project within budget, schedule and/or quality constraints), functionality risk 
(failure to deliver intended functionality), political risk (negative consequences of changing power 
relationships with users), or security risk (negative consequences of insecure systems). A 
limitation of this conceptualization is that these risk components can often overlap and therefore 
are not independent, contrary to what the term component typically means. For example, 
functionality risk can be viewed as part of project risk and sometimes can cause political risk and 
security risk. 
Risk as Factors Leading to Loss  
The second conceptualization of risk is as risk factors such as size of project, use of new 
software, or malicious employees.  Some studies combine risk factors from various sources such 
as task, technology, or actors.  Others subdivide these sources into finer categories, for example, 
specifying a type of actor such as customer or supplier. Our companion article identifies and 
organizes 228 risk factors found in the 46 articles in our literature search. 
Risk as Probability of Negative Outcomes  
Approximately one third of the studies suggest that risk should be measured as a probability 
distribution of negative outcomes, often weighted by financial loss.  The probabilities of negative 
outcomes were subjective estimates or numbers computed based on statistical techniques.  
CRITICAL CLARIFICATIONS 
We believe that the IS risk literature emphasizes negative outcomes rather than the range of 
outcomes approach because it reflects managerial preoccupation with meeting goals. The 
emphasis on negative outcomes deserves further comment because the decision analysis 
literature typically uses a different definition. We will look at three related aspects of the definition 
of risk: 
• Should IS risk focus on negative outcomes? 
• What is the role of goals and expectations in IS risk? 
• What is the baseline for assessing risk? 
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Should IS Risk Focus on Negative Outcomes? 
In contrast to the emphasis on negative outcomes in the IS risk literature, decision analysts and 
operations researchers typically conceptualize risk as a probability distribution of possible 
outcomes based on a model that starts with probability distributions for important parameters.  
Those probability distributions may be discrete or continuous. For example, discrete probabilities 
often appear in decision tree examples related to whether or not to drill for oil based on 
parameters of the local geology, whereas continuous distributions may appear in examples 
related to complex R&D decisions in pharmaceuticals. In decision trees with discrete probabilities, 
the best decision on an expected value basis can be computed at each decision node, providing 
a bottom-up method for computing the best decision at the top decision node.  For models with 
continuous probability distributions, the model’s mathematical relationships generate the results 
for each run of a Monte Carlo simulation after a random number generator is used to select a 
particular value from the probability distribution for each parameter. Doing multiple runs 
generates a probability distribution for indicators such as revenue, profit, and market share. 
Those probability distributions can be used to estimate not only expected values, but also 
probabilities, such as the probability of making more than $X or losing more than $Y. With either 
discrete or continuous formulations it is possible to analyze sensitivity of the results to the 
probability estimates and other parameters. 
In contrast, the majority of IS professionals do not conceptualize or analyze risk in the way 
prescribed by the decision analysis literature.  For example, in 2002 the Cutter Consortium [2002]  
surveyed IT managers about their organizations' risk management practices. The breakdown of 
definitions of risk was: 
• 49%: the potential for the realization of unwanted, negative consequences of an event or 
situation 
• 22%: an uncertain condition or event that involves a negative or positive effect on 
achieving some objective 
• 22%: any issue or event that may cause deviation from a plan 
• 4%: the amount that can afford to be lost 
• 2%: the differences between means and ends. 
Close to half of the respondents (49%) used what Cutter calls “the traditional definition of risk”, in 
which risk connotes negative outcomes, and risk management primarily deals with negative 
consequences of some event.  
“Nearly the same number (44%) are evenly split between the definition of risk that could 
include positive consequences of some event, as well as negative aspects. [Of those] 
about half are using the definition of risk that explicitly includes positive or negative 
effects, and half define risk as being any deviation from a plan. ...Those organizations 
that use formal risk management seem to favor the more traditional definition  [i.e., risk 
as negative outcomes] over the definitions inclusive of negative and positive effects or 
deviation from a plan.” [Cutter Consortium, 2002]   
Thus, the asymmetrical “negative outcomes” approach preferred by a slim majority of the Cutter 
respondents differs from the symmetrical “range of outcomes” approach in much of the decision 
analysis literature.  
A 2001 survey of members of risk management SIGs in five professional organizations related to 
project and risk management obtained similar results. Describing their organization’s definition of 
risk, 54% said it focused exclusively on negative results, 34% said it included both threats and 
opportunities, and the remaining 13% cited uncertain events with uncertain effects or “other.” In 
the same survey, 54% said that their organizations used risk management processes to manage 
threats. That 54% included 26% that used no explicit opportunity management and 28% that 
used separate processes for opportunity management and threat management [Roberts and 
Kitterman, 2002].   
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The divergence between the definition of risk used by the decision analysis community and the 
definition used by the majority of the IS community raises a quandary related to any purportedly 
general model of IS risk.  If the model adopts a theoretically pure but unfamiliar, unintuitive, or 
impractical definition, its use will be limited. If the model adopts a commonly accepted but 
incomplete view, its results may be skewed.  
What is the Role of Goals and Expectations in IS Risk? 
Few of the risk models in the IS risk literature explicitly consider goals and expectations, even 
though goals and expectations play an important role regardless of which conceptualization of 
risk is used.  Goals and expectations that exist prior to the time interval under consideration 
(which might be an accounting period or the duration of a project) are typically the basis for 
evaluating success.  Outcomes that might be viewed as great successes under one set of goals 
and expectations might be viewed as dismal failures under other sets of goals and expectations. 
Attending to the goals and expectations that determine which outcomes are positive or negative 
is not only important, but essential if risk is viewed in terms of negative outcomes in relation to 
goals. 
Goals and expectations also affect outcomes directly by setting the aspiration level of work 
system participants. Setting the bar higher or lower makes it easier or more difficult to succeed. 
Similarly, stretch goals might inspire some people to accomplish more under some circumstances 
or might lead to depression under other circumstances.  
The mere fact of measuring success against goals and expectations also affects the meaning of 
risk factors and success factors and the meaning of their impact on the probabilities of positive 
and negative outcomes. Assume, for example, that management expects a project to generate $1 
million in benefits and that a risk analysis identifies risk factors A, B, and C whose presence may 
make it more difficult to attain that outcome. When setting the goal, management may or may not 
have considered the presence of the risk factors, but after announcing the goal, management 
probably will be loathe to change it even if additional risk factors are identified that reduce the 
probability of success. Compare that situation to a different project whose expected value 
determined by a Monte Carlo simulation is $1 million. If the Monte Carlo simulation did not include 
relevant risk factors, we would assume that a follow-up simulation including the risk factors would 
reduce the expected value. In the first case, the risk factors present an additional challenge to 
project personnel but do not change management’s stated goal or expectation; in the other case, 
the risk factors affect the expected value (whether or not management would be willing to change 
its goals or stated expectations). The first case represents the logic of the negative outcomes 
approach for analyzing risk because risk analysis is mostly about identifying and overcoming risks 
in order to meet the goal.  Regardless of whether management holds firm to a $1 million goal in 
the second case, the Monte Carlo simulation will say that the expected value is less than $1 
million when the risk factors are considered. 
What is the Baseline for Assessing Risk? 
Considering both risk factors and success factors in the analysis complicates things further. A risk 
analysis should contain both risk factors and success factors if both affect the probability 
distribution of outcomes.  If a risk analysis is to produce a mathematically calculated distribution 
of outcomes, there must be some way to quantify the separate impacts of each risk factor and 
success factor, plus any interaction effects that might occur. And even assuming there is a good 
theoretical vehicle for computing the impacts, it is not clear how to assess the validity of the 
individual impact factors. Regardless of whether they were estimates based on a specific 
situation or regression results from a large survey, the numbers themselves would probably be 
difficult for most managers to understand and use. 
In an even more fundamental sense, if success factors increase the probability of positive 
outcomes and risk factors increase the probability of negative outcomes, what is the baseline 
from which these effects occur? The two approaches for defining the baseline are: 
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1.  Managers start from a baseline assumption that none of the success factors and risk 
factors is present, and intuitively adjust expectations based on the combined impact of all 
the success factors or risk factors that are present.  
2. Managers start with an expectation based on their perceptions, experience, and 
intuition, and then adjust that expectation based on the presence or absence of each 
relevant success factor or risk factor.  
Either approach assumes that managers are capable of identifying and combining all relevant 
impacts and uncertainties related to the presence or non-presence of relevant success factors 
and risk factors. That seems like quite a feat. Human abilities to estimate probabilities of future 
events are notoriously poor [Tversky and Kahneman, 1974].  Similar cognitive limits would apply 
if managers attempt to make quantitative estimates related to impacts of numerous, partially 
interacting success factors and risk factors, especially when there is no reliable way to compute 
or describe a real baseline. 
APPROACHES USED IN EXISTING RISK MODELS 
The literature contains many compilations of risk factors and clusters of risks through Delphi 
studies and empirical research [Barki et al., 1993; Bashein et al., 1994; Keil et al., 1998; Doherty 
and King, 2001; Jiang et al., 2001; Schmidt et al., 2001; Smith et al., 2001; Jiang et al., 2002; 
Scott and Vessey, 2002]. Only a few articles describe explicit models that explain the risk factors 
or use the risk factors in a risk management process.  Table 2 identifies typical risk models and 
their limitations. Most of the models are limited to a subset of IS-related risks and provide limited 
guidance for risk management. We will return to these models after presenting our model. 
TEMPORAL NATURE OF RISK  
System-related risk manifests itself over time.  Some risks exist prior to a phase of a system’s life 
cycle; others emerge during that phase.  Risk management techniques applied during a phase of 
the life cycle can lower risks during that phase.  The risk at the end of one phase influences risk 
in the next phase.   
Only 12 of the 46 risk studies in our literature survey specifically address the temporal nature of 
risks, and most of those studies focus on software development.  This part of the literature 
typically has three limitations:  
1. Some risk studies focus on specific phases of the software life cycle, without recognizing 
that risks in one stage can have an impact on other stages.   
2. If the risk model does not include risk management, then the impacts of approaches to 
reduce risk are not evaluated.  Risk management is an ongoing activity of identifying and  
Table 2.  Risk Models in the IS Literature 
Type of Model Description  Source Limitations 
Software Risk 
Model 




Higuera and Haimes, 
1996; Kontio, 1998] 




Software development project 
performance is influenced by fit 
between risk exposure and risk 
management 
[Barki et al., 2001] No organizing framework for 
risk factors.  Does not 
distinguish between initial and 
emergent risks.    
Socio-
technological 
Sociotechnical model of 
organizational change is used to 
[Lyytinen et al., 1996] Focuses on components 
internal to the firm (task, 
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model classify risks by system, project, 
and management sources.  
structure, actors, and 
technology), mainly during a 
software project’s development 
phase 
Options Model Managing IT investment risk by 
choosing options that balance 
risk and reward.  Considers risks 
arising outside the scope of 
development 
[Benaroch, 2002] Requires mapping of risks to 
specific options; high level of 
generality makes it difficult to 
use for identifying risks  
Performance 
Model 
Performance risk explains the 
effect of coordination and 
uncertainty on process control 
and product flexibility 
[Nidumolu, 1995; 
Nidumolu, 1996] 
Limited to coordination 
mechanisms. 
 
reducing risk. Risk management activities should be included in a realistic model of system-
related risk because recognition of risk factors encourages appropriate risk reduction 
tactics. For example, managers of a project that lacks a crucial skill might bring in an 
employee or consultant who has those skills or might change the project so that it does not 
require those skills. The available risk reduction tactics depend on the goals and 
expectations that apply. For example, a project whose goal is to minimize costs will have 
extra difficulty hiring expensive consultants.   
3. Even when looking at a particular life cycle phase, most of these studies do not distinguish 
between initial and emergent risks. Distinguishing between risks that exist prior to a phase 
and those that emerge during a phase is important for risk management because factors 
that exist prior to a particular project or operational phase may be managed differently than 
those that emerge during that phase.  Examples of pre-existing risk factors include major 
difficulties with previous projects and lack of knowledge about the technology that will be 
used. Examples of emergent risk factors include departure of key personnel during a 
project and need to divert resources to other purposes. New risk factors such as these can 
emerge due to the past and current operation of the work system or based on inherent 
variability, mishaps, and internal and external events that occurred or might occur during 
the time interval of interest.    
Most of the 12 studies that addressed the temporal nature of risks were drawn from the software 
risk literature, which emphasizes the iterative nature of risk assessment and the importance of 
risk management.  As an example, Table 3 shows the framework proposed by Charette [1989]. 
Other researchers use similar classifications with slightly varying titles. For example, Boehm 
[1989] calls these steps risk assessment (risk identification, risk analysis, risk prioritization) and 
risk control (risk management planning, risk resolution, risk monitoring).  
 
Table 3. Risk Management Framework from Software Engineering 
Risk Analysis Risk Management 
• Risk Identification:  What can go wrong? • Risk Planning: Selecting appropriate risk 
abatement strategies  
• Risk Measurement:  What is the magnitude of 
the risk – the expected consequence? 
• Risk Controlling:  Implementing the plan’s 
control mechanism for risk aversion strategies 
• Risk Evaluation:  How can risks be prioritized, 
and how are the risk measurements related to 
acceptable levels of risk?  
• Risk Monitoring: Refining actions and providing 
feedback 
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However, since these models focus only on software development issues, they do not include the 
dynamics of risk in the broader realm of projects or systems in general. Software development 
models are inadequate for describing, analyzing, or communicating the range of risks that are 
relevant to IS projects and IS in operation because many of these risks are business and 
organizational risks that are often considered beyond the scope of software development. We 
believe that frameworks and models based upon work systems [Alter, 2002; 2003] may be more 
useful for analyzing business and operational risks and for communicating with business 
customers, users, and other stakeholders who are often important sources of IS risk. 
In addition to the software risk studies, Lyytinen and Nidumolu also address the temporal nature 
of risks in different phases of IS projects [Nidumolu, 1995; Lyytinen et al., 1996; Nidumolu, 1996; 
Lyytinen et al, 1998].  However, they do not explicitly consider emergent risks during a specific 
phase of an IS project. Lytinnen’s model suggests that software risks are addressed through 
sequential attention shaping and intervention.  The risk items are derived from postulated causal 
dependencies between risky incidents (events or states in the real world that can cause loss) and 
losses.  Risk resolution techniques are based on how interventions influence risky incidents.  
Major variations in the socio-technical components of a system form risky incidents that increase 
the difficulty in estimating a development project’s performance results  [Nidumolu, 1995; 
Nidumolu, 1996].  
ORGANIZATION OF RISK VARIABLES 
Appendix I shows that different studies include different risk factors or components.  Only a few 
studies attempt to organize these variables.  Risk variables can apply to information systems in 
operation, to projects, or to special types of systems or projects.  Many of the risk factors that 
apply to information systems in operation also apply to projects and to any work system, 
regardless of whether IT is involved. For example, risk factors for any work system include lack of 
management support, lack of required knowledge and skill, and lack of required resources. These 
risk factors also apply to projects, but some additional risk factors for projects do not apply to 
work systems in general, such as inadequate project schedule and inadequate clarity about 
project requirements. The organization of risk factors is the subject of our companion article 
[Sherer and Alter, 2004].   
Even though literally hundreds of risk variables are mentioned in the literature, combining various 
lists from various authors does not guarantee that all risks relevant to a particular situation will be 
identified.  Even sophisticated probabilistic risk assessments used to develop accident scenarios 
for complex engineered systems, such as nuclear power plants, suffer from “completeness 
uncertainty”, uncertainty about whether all significant phenomena and relationships have been 
considered [Vesely and Rasmuson, 1984]. This uncertainty can arise from biases that often cloud 
risk identification [Tversky and Kahneman, 1974]. 
III. ALTERNATIVE MODELS FOR ANALYZING AND MANAGING RISK 
The IS risk literature lacks a broadly accepted model of risk.  Such a  model would organize risk 
factors in a meaningful fashion, recognize that risk is measured against goals, and account for 
emergent risks and risk management, and hencethe temporal nature of risk. 
Figure 1 presents a risk model that we believe satisfies the four criteria (clarity, practicality of use, 
completeness, and adaptability) identified in Section II for a general, yet broadly applicable risk 
model.  Figure 2 is a reduced version of the more general model in Figure 1. Both are in  the 
same basic form, except that the first model uses a “range of outcomes” approach to risk, 
whereas the second model uses a “negative outcomes” approach and is therefore not quite as 
general. In both models, system-related risk is about risks for work performed during a time 
interval. This work may be an entire project, a phase in a project (such as development or 
implementation), or the operation of a work system during the time interval in question. Risk is 
fundamentally about uncertainty in work performance and the resulting outcomes.  Presenting  
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Figure 1.  Model for Analyzing and Managing Contingencies Based on a “Range of Outcomes” 






-  Identify Risks 
-  Evaluate Risks 
-  Respond 














Sources of Uncertainty 
 
Figure 2.  Model for Analyzing and Managing Risks Based on a Negative Outcomes Approach to 
Risk 
Communications of the Association for Information Systems (Volume14, 2004) 1-28                                   11 
A General, but Readily Adaptable Model of Information Risk by S. Alter and S.A. Sherer 
both models reflects the distinction between the two approaches to risk and provides users a 
choice of which approach they prefer.  The “range of outcomes” model is more general; the 
“negative outcomes” model is similar in flow but different in detail. Both models were designed to 
support further adaptation and simplification in the sense of allowing users to address or ignore 
specific parts of the models, and to be clear about which issues they are including or excluding. 
Both models attempt to satisfy a number of goals: 
• Representing risk and risk management in a much more comprehensive way than is 
possible with numerous, largely unrelated treatments of risk and risk factors as lengthy 
lists of things that could go wrong or of factors that might be correlated to negative 
outcomes 
• Demonstrating that either version of a single risk model can cover a broad range of 
relevant situations  
• Providing useful guidance without forcing the user to adopt a particular stance concerning 
the collection and use of specific quantitative or qualitative data 
Either version of the model should be meaningful to potential users. For example, a general 
manager could use it to support risk management for an operational information system. 
Similarly, a software development team could use it to help organize a quantitative risk analysis 
based on years of data collected from a CMM (Capability Maturity Model) level 5 programming 
group.   
Both versions of the model apply to work systems in general, as well as special cases of work 
systems such as information systems, projects, and more specialized cases such as ERP 
systems and reengineering projects.1 Using the work system framework (rather than a 
representation of a software project, for example) as a central building block implies that the idea 
of risk management in relation to expectations and sources of uncertainty is not just about the 
technical work of IT professionals. The same general logic applies to risk management for almost 
any work system of significance. 
The graphical representations in both figures illustrate relationships between facets of the model 
including: 
• goals and expectations,  
• risk factors and other sources of uncertainty,  
• the operation of the work system whose risks are being managed,  
• the risk management (contingency management) effort,  
• the possible outcomes and their probabilities,  
• the impacts on other systems,  
• the resulting financial gains or losses.  
                                                     
1 A work system is a system in which human participants and/or machines perform work using information, 
technology, and other resources to produce products and/or services for internal or external customers 
[Alter, 2003].  A work system is a general case of systems operating within or across organizations. An 
information system is a work system whose work practices are devoted to processing information or data. 
Similarly, a project is a work system designed to produce a particular product and then go out of existence. 
The triangular icon that appears three times in Figure 1 and in Figure 2 stands for the work 
system framework, a graphical representation of the nine elements included in even a 
rudimentary understanding of a work system. The nine elements include work practices, 
participants, information, technologies, products and services produced, customers, environment, 
infrastructure, and strategy. 
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The facets and relationships between them will be discussed individually, starting with the work 
system whose risks are being managed. For the sake of simplicity, the discussion of each facet 
will refer to the more general “range of outcomes” model in Figure 1. Later, after discussing the 
facets shared by the two models, we will return to the relative advantages and disadvantages of 
each model. 
FACETS OF THE GENERAL MODEL  
Work System Whose Risks are Being Managed  
At the heart of the model in Figure 1 is a work system whose risks are being managed. The 
specific work system under consideration might be a work system supported by one or more 
information systems, or might be a specific information system, project, or supply chain that 
crosses organizational boundaries. (All of these are special cases of work systems.) It also might 
be a special case of any of them, such as a software development project or ERP implementation 
project. The reason for placing the work system framework at the model’s core is that the same 
logic concerning sources of uncertainty, risk management, and outcomes applies for work 
systems in general, information systems, projects, and all special cases. The only difference is 
that the risk factors and other specifics may differ depending on the special case being 
considered.    
Goals and Expectations  
The model in Figure 1 starts with goals and expectations. The three arrows emanating from 
“goals and expectations” represent  
• the impact of expectations and goals on the relevant risk factors and sources of 
uncertainty,  
• the impact of goals and expectations on the level of aspiration by work system 
participants including managers, and  
• the role of goals and expectations in evaluation of the outcomes after the time interval of 
interest. 
Sources of Uncertainty  
In addition to any relevant risk factors and success factors, the sources of uncertainty considered 
in risk management should include inherent variability in the situation, mishaps, internal events, 
and external events. Some risk factors and other sources of uncertainty (such as inherent 
variability) exist and can be recognized before the time interval of interest. Additional risk factors, 
success factors, and other sources of uncertainty (such as personnel turnover, mishaps, and 
organizational chaos) may emerge during the time interval. Regardless of when specific sources 
of uncertainty become evident, the goal of risk management is to understand and contain the 
uncertainties to assure that goals and expectations are satisfied. The double arrows between the 
work system in operation and the sources of uncertainty indicate that the uncertainties affect the 
operation of the work system and vice versa. For example, the risk factor inadequate expertise 
might cause significant delays. In turn, those delays could then cause additional uncertainties due 
to insufficient time to complete the work carefully. 
Risk Management (Contingency Management)  
The model in Figure 1 uses the term contingency management rather than risk management 
because a range of outcomes model places substantial emphasis on both positive and negative 
occurrences. Although contingency management may start with an initial risk identification and 
evaluation, it is assumed to continue throughout the time interval under consideration. The arrow 
from sources of uncertainty to contingency management says that contingency management 
decisions will respond to changes in the sources of uncertainty. The double arrows between 
contingency management and work system being analyzed indicate that contingency 
management affects the work system and vice versa. For example, extra control measures 
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introduced to reduce uncertainties due to inadequate expertise might absorb a lot of participant 
time, thereby potentially affecting measures of performance related to efficiency. To maintain the 
desired level of efficiency, managers and other work system participants might create temporary 
accommodations such as shifting work assignments in a way that maintains the desired rate of 
progress. 
Other Work Systems  
Information systems, projects, and other work systems never exist in isolation. Instead, they 
affect and are affected by other work systems. The arrow from work system being analyzed to 
“impacts on other systems and projects” says that positive and negative outcomes are not just 
direct outcomes about the work system under consideration, but may also include outcomes 
related to impacts on other systems and projects.  
Range of Outcomes and Their Probabilities  
The range of possibilities includes both disappointments and positive surprises that occur relative 
to the original goals and expectations.  Some of the outcomes may occur during the time interval 
under consideration, but the totality of outcomes is evaluated after the end of the time interval. 
Financial Results  
Financial results are the probability distributions of outcomes, both positive and negative, 
expressed in monetary terms. 
THE ALTERNATIVE MODEL 
The alternative model in Figure 2 conceptualizes risk in terms of negative outcomes rather than 
the range of outcomes and related probabilities. The general form is the same as the more 
general model in Figure 1, but a number of the terms are different.  
• Instead of risk and success factors, it only mentions risk factors. 
• Instead of contingency management, it only mentions risk management. 
• Instead of range of outcomes and their probabilities, it only mentions  
      negative outcomes 
• Instead of financial outcomes, it mentions financial loss. 
By conceptualizing risk in terms of negative outcomes, the risk model in Figure 2 is consistent 
with the view of IS risk management used by the majority of organizations and by much of the IS 
risk literature. Based on these results from practice and from the IS literature, we believe that use 
of a negative outcomes approach is consistent with the way most managers think about risk 
related to information systems in operation and IS projects. Although the range of outcomes 
approach is more general and complete, we believe it has relatively little utility in most IS risk 
analysis because so much of the management attention in the area focuses on reducing the 
probability of negative outcomes relative to goals and expectations. 
Another reason for adopting the negative outcomes approach is that it simplifies the entire 
discussion and makes management engagement more practical. If the baseline is simply a goal 
to be reached, risk factors need to be identified and prioritized in order to manage risks, but it is 
possible to skip much of the complexity related to the meaning of a mathematically computed 
expected value. It may be possible to quantify the risks and impacts in certain highly experienced 
and sophisticated software development organizations in stable environments, but such situations 
are rare. In typical business situations, the relevant historical data does not exist, and variability 
from year to year and system to system is large due to competitive forces, internal politics, and 
contingencies related to specific information systems. 
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OTHER ADAPTATIONS OF THE GENERAL MODEL 
The idea of alternative models can be extended further by looking at the various facets of the 
models in Figures 1 and 2 and asking whether some of those facets might be eliminated or 
simplified to tailor the model to the user’s knowledge and situation-specific needs without 
destroying its potential usefulness.  We call this model characteristic adaptability. 
Designing a risk model so that certain facets can be eliminated is consistent with the idea that 
genuinely useful models should be tailored to the situation users encounter.  For example, a 
model that requires continuous probability distributions will not be used effectively in situations 
when there is no agreement about those distributions or when the potential users lack the training 
necessary to understand what probability distributions mean. Similarly, models that focus on 
initial conditions and ignore management actions during the time interval under consideration will 
be less realistic than models that consider those management actions. Table 4 identifies 
ramifications of eliminating or ignoring various facets of the general risk model that was shown in 
Figure 1. 
 
Table 4. Implications of Eliminating or Ignoring Various Facets of the General Risk Model  
in Figure 1 
 
Facet of the 
General Model 
Implications of Eliminating or Ignoring this Facet 
Definition of risk 
 




Possible adaptation: Eliminate goals and expectations from the model because the 
user wants to focus on the range of outcomes. 
Ramifications: Eliminating explicit inclusion of goals and expectations would make 
it impossible to use a negative outcomes approach because there would be no 
basis for evaluating the results.  Eliminating goals and expectations would have 
other ramifications: 
…  It might bring into question the meaning or intensity of some of the risk or 
success factors by eliminating a baseline for comparison. 
 
…  It might assume unrealistic behavior by managers, who typically pay a lot of 
attention to goals and expectations.  
Success factors 
 
Possible adaptation: Eliminate success factors from the model 
Ramifications: Eliminating the success factors might skew the analysis by 




Possible adaptation: Eliminate risk factors from the model 
Ramifications: Risk factors can be built into the underlying assumptions and not 
mentioned explicitly in the analysis. It seems likely that treating risk factors as 
implicit will reduce their visibility and might lead to overlooking important issues. 
Other sources of 
uncertainty 
Possible adaptation: Eliminate other sources of uncertainty. Just consider risk 
factors in the negative outcomes approach or risk factors and success factors in 
the range of outcomes approach. 
Ramifications: If the user believes that risk factors and success factors should 
encompass all known sources of uncertainty, then the use of risk factors and 
success factors would suffice. If the user believes the opposite, eliminating other 
sources of uncertainty from the analysis would be acceptable only if these were 
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Facet of the 
General Model 
Implications of Eliminating or Ignoring this Facet 
relatively inconsequential. 
Initial risk factors 
 
Possible adaptation: Eliminate initial risk factors because the risk analysis will start 
after the project has begun. 
Ramifications: It is hard to imagine how a risk analysis for an information system or 
IS project could be done without considering initial risk factors. Also, it seems 
unlikely anyone would want to start risk analysis after a project begins. Even if that 
happened and emergent risk factors appeared, many of the initial risk factors 
would probably still be in force.  
Emergent risks 
 
Possible adaptation: Eliminate emergent risk factors by performing the entire risk 
analysis must occur before the project begins. 
Ramifications:  For some model users such as managers involved in making 
investment decisions, performing a complete risk analysis before the project begins 
can make sense because someone else will do the subsequent analysis after the 
project is underway. 
Type of work system Possible adaptation: Ignore the type of work system.  
Ramifications: Risk factors and success factors for work systems in general 
provide a useful first cut at the relevant risk factors and success factors for most 
specific systems, but it is hard to imagine why one would want to ignore risk and 
success factors associated with a specific system type when doing a risk analysis. 
Risk management 
 
Possible adaptation: Eliminate risk management from the model because the 
analysis looks at the effect of risk factors and/or success factors and assumes risk 
management will happen on an all things being equal basis. 
Ramifications:  A straightforward a priori risk analysis supporting an investment 
decision might take this approach. Eliminating risk management from the model 
would not make sense, however, if the analysis were meant to cover an ongoing 
project. 
 
Impacts on other 
systems 
Possible adaptation: Eliminate consideration of impacts on other systems because 
that would make the analysis too broad. 
Ramifications: Simplifies the analysis by reducing the scope of the positive and/or 
negative outcomes considered in the analysis.  Ignoring potentially relevant 
outcomes may change the results of the analysis. 
Full range of 
outcomes 
Possible adaptation: Follow some version of the model in Figure 2 and consider 
only negative outcomes. 




Possible adaptation: Exclude probabilities of events or parameter values because 
the probabilities cannot be estimated reliably or because disagreements about the 
probabilities are large.  
Ramifications:  Excluding probabilities makes it impossible to compute expected 
values and restricts the types of quantitative results that a risk analysis can 
produce. 
Range of financial 
results 
Possible adaptation: Do not determine financial results. Just focus on positive 
and/or negative outcomes and actions to make the positive outcomes more likely 
and the negative outcomes less likely. 
Ramifications: The analysis cannot produce a probability distribution of financial 
outcomes, but can still help in identifying hazards and in supporting risk 
management.  
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COMPARISON WITH OTHER MODELS IN THE LITERATURE 
Table 2 listed five risk models in the literature.  The foregoing discussion of the model we propose 
demonstrates that our model covers a number of topics not included in the other models. Table 5 
lists topics in our model and indicates whether those topics are or are not included explicitly in the 
models in Table 2.  Table 5 is not meant as a criticism of the previous models because each of 
those models was designed for a particular purpose and served that purpose.  
In contrast to the previous models, our risk model is more complete, adaptable, and practical for 
use by business managers.  For example, the software risk model includes most aspects of our 
negative outcomes model but focuses only on software development through the point when the 
software meets requirements rather than when the software is used successfully as part of a new 
or improved work system. Our model is more useful for business managers who are concerned 
with managing all risks related to whatever work system is being analyzed. In contrast, Table 5 
says that the contingency model, the socio-technological model, and the performance model do 
not explicitly consider emerging sources of uncertainty, nor do they attempt to quantify loss. 
These three models focus on different relationships, first between risk management and 
exposure, second among firm-specific factors and potential loss, and third, between uncertainty 
and performance.  While the models are all useful to business managers, each of them is limited 
to a particular aspect of risk analysis. The options model addresses investment risk across a 
sequence of choices. It includes positive and negative financial outcomes but does not identify 
other sources of uncertainty in addition to specific competitive, market, and firm specific risks.  
Most of the models implicitly assume specific goals but provide no guidelines for measuring the 
impact of goals on risk.  
IV.  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This article attempted to advance the discussion of system-related risks by demonstrating steps 
toward better models for managing risk. It began by discussing issues related to 
conceptualizations of risk, the importance of goals and expectations, approaches used by 
different risk models, the temporal nature of risk, and the organization of risk variables. It 
discussed why a broadly applicable model for understanding and analyzing system- and project-
related risks should define risk clearly and should include: 
Table 5. Inclusion or Non-inclusion of Facets of Our Model in Previous Models 
                         Degree of Inclusion in the Previous Models   
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Other sources 
of uncertainty 
Included Not included Not explicitly 
included 









































IS project IS project  IS projects and 
IS in operation  
IS projects  
Impacts on 
other systems 
Included Not included Not explicit Included Not included 
Outcomes Negative System quality; 
cost gap 










Expected loss Impact of 
potential loss  
(measured on 
a  Likert scale) 







• risk factors and other sources of uncertainty,  
• the temporal nature of risks,  
• a clear baseline for characterizing and evaluating outcomes,  
• explicit recognition of risk management activities.   
It presented a new, highly adaptable risk analysis model based on those ideas, and for 
comparison showed an alternative model based on a different conceptualization of risk.  
The discussion of topics needed in a risk management model and the presentation of alternative 
versions of the new risk model lead to conclusions concerning: 
• the model’s potential value as a step toward understanding system- and project- risk 
• the impact of goals and expectations 
• relative value of the negative outcomes versus range of outcomes approaches 
• use of the work system framework in risk analysis 
• potential value of tracing risk management activities. 
We will discuss each topic in turn. 
The Model’s Potential Value as a Step Toward Understanding System and Project Risk 
The alternative models for analyzing and managing system- and project risk in organizations 
(Figures 1 and 2) illustrate shortcomings of the existing IS risk literature, which relies too much on 
lists of risk factors and not enough on the dynamics of system-related risk. The models define risk 
and include risk factors and other sources of uncertainty, goals and expectations, the temporal 
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sequence, and risk management activities. They apply to work systems in general, as well as 
information systems, projects, and more specialized cases. They can be used to motivate and 
organize further exploration of the IS risk literature, including comparison of the issues 
emphasized in different parts of the literature, but there is greater potential value in developing 
practical risk management tools. 
A possible next step would involve using this model to develop risk diagnostics and tools for 
improving risk management. Use of the diagnostics in any particular situation would combine 
relevant risks and risk factors for work systems in general plus additional risks and risk factors 
associated with the specific type of situation that is being managed. In developing practical risk 
diagnostics it would be important to verify that those diagnostics fit comfortably into risk 
management processes that are practical for the types of managers in the relevant situations. 
Impact of Goals and Expectations  
Everyday life teaches us that goals and expectations affect action.  Research has shown that 
individuals’ risk propensity affects their behaviors on software projects [Keil et al, 2000; Smith et 
al, 2001].  Goals and expectations also affect risk management in a variety of ways including 
determining the level of aspiration in doing work, creating goal-related risk factors (e.g., the risk 
factor of low aspirations due to slack goals vs. the risk factor of depression and cynicism due to 
impossible goals), and forming the basis of evaluating the results.  The effects of goals and 
expectations on a series of issues deserve additional research:  
First, is there any evidence that the degree of slack or over-reach in goals and expectations 
affects the way risk is conceived and managed in real situations? 
Second, which risk factors and risks seem to be dependent on goals rather than other aspects of 
the situation?  
Third, to what extent is the high failure rate of IS projects a result of how high the bar is set rather 
than a result of other factors ostensibly being studied? 
Negative Outcomes Versus Range of Outcomes 
We identified two possible conceptualizations of risk that could be used in a risk management 
model. The range of outcomes approach considers both positive and negative outcomes, 
whereas the negative outcomes approach focuses on foreseeable things that can go wrong, in 
some cases including the severity and probability of each negative occurrence.  Most of the IS 
risk literature uses the latter conceptualization. In contrast, the decision science literature typically 
gives equal weight to positive and negative occurrences and is concerned about the distribution 
of outcomes around an expected value, rather than just meeting management goals and 
expectations.  Our most general risk model is based on the “range of outcomes” 
conceptualization of risk, but we argued that it did not seem as useful or practical for IS risk 
management as the model that conceptualized risk as negative outcomes. We recognize that the 
“real options” planning  technique of economics uses the range of outcomes, but is about 
sequences of investment decisions rather than risk management for projects or operational 
systems. The impacts of using one approach or the other in analyzing system or project risk in 
practice should be studied. The inclusion of contingency management also raises numerous 
questions about how managers perceive risks, risk factors, success, and success factors, and 
what types of alternatives they pursue under what circumstances. For example, how useful are 
current taxonomies of how managers perceive risk and success, and of the types of risk reduction 
and success assurance tactics they use?  Taxonomies of these types should help in developing 
the next level of the model. 
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Use of the Work System Framework in Risk Analysis 
 We believe that using work systems as a central concept overcomes some of the limitations of 
previous IS risk models that focus on specific aspects of the development process (e.g. software 
engineering) or system usage (e.g. coordination mechanisms).  The use of the work system 
framework in the risk models in Figures 1 and 2 serves a number of purposes that are described 
in more detail in the companion article [Sherer and Alter, 2004].   Because many of our 
arguments favor using work systems as a basic concept, it would be worth examining contrary 
arguments that using the concept of work system as a common denominator is undesirable 
because it generates less focused analysis or for other reasons. 
Tracing Risk Management Activities  
The risk models in Figures 1 and 2 summarize a general logic of risk management based on a 
combination of goals and expectations, initial and emergent risk factors, other sources of 
uncertainty, the operation of the work system being analyzed, and the management actions 
related to risk abatement. An important next step is to trace how risk management activities 
actually occur in different types of situations. For example, what topics do managers discuss; to 
what extent do they actually consider risk factors; what is the relative balance of discussions of 
the work system being supported versus discussions of the information or project that is 
attempting to support the work system? In addition to testing the validity of the new risk model, 
tracing how risk management actually occurs might reveal directions for improving the model and 
for creating tools that could help managers reduce impacts of risks they face.  
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APPENDIX I: A SAMPLE OF THE IS RISK LITERATURE 
Source # of 
varia
bles 







[Austin, 2001]  Shortcuts Model to analyze the 





[Barki et al., 1993] 35 Technological 
newness, application 









IS project  Scores in 
different 
stages of life 
cycle 
[Barki et al., 2001] 23 Technological 
newness, application 






project performance is 
influenced by fit 
between risk exposure 





IS project   
[Bashein et al., 
1994] 
3 Lack of sustained 
management 
commitment, 
unrealistic scope and 
expectations, 
resistance to change 
Survey of BPR 
consultants 













risk resolution strategies 









[Benaroch, 2002] 3 Firm specific risks, 
competitive risks, 
market risks 
Managing IT investment 
risk by choosing options 
that balance risk and 
Components IS projects 
and IS in 
operation 
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reward  
[Boehm, 1989] 10 Personnel shortfalls, 
unrealistic schedules 
and budgets, 
continuous stream of 
requirements 




theory to make 











[Boehm and Ross, 
1989] 
  Model with steps for risk 
assessment 
(identification, analysis, 
prioritization) and risk 
control (management 
planning, resolution, 










[Boehm, 1988] 10 Personnel shortfalls, 
unrealistic schedules 
and budgets, 
continuous stream of 
requirements 
changes, shortfalls in 
components, task, 
straining capabilities 











Risk framework Components E-business 
operation  
 












[Clemons, 1995] 2 Functionality risk, 
political risk 
Scenario analysis to 







[Clemons et al., 
1995] 
5 Political risk, financial 










[Clemons, 1991] 5 Financial risk, 
technical risk, 
functionality risk, 
project risk, systemic 
risk 














treatment of  
organizational vs. 
technical issues  
Organization-al 
issues, not risk 
IS project Project 
phases 
[Gogan et al., 1999] 5 Time constraints, 
system 
interdependence, 
project size, project 
Adds two new variables 




IS project  
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structure, technology 
familiarity 
[Grover et al., 
1995] 








severity of problems 







64 Software risk 
taxonomy by class, 
element, and attribute 









[Jiang et al., 2001] 34 Technological 
acquisition, 
application size, lack 
of team’s application 
expertise, lack of user 
support, lack of clarity 
of role definitions, 
lack of user 
experience 
Instrument to measure 
software development 
risk 
Risk factors IS project  
[Jiang et al., 2002] 34 Technological 
acquisition, 
application size, lack 
of team’s application 
expertise, lack of user 
support, lack of clarity 
of role definitions, 




behavioral aspects are 
more influential in risk 
reduction than those 
aimed at technical risks. 
Risk factors IS project  
[Jones, 1994] 63 See contents For each factor, 




resistance, root causes  
Risk Factors Software 
project 
 
[Keil et al., 1998] 11 Lack of top mgt 
commitment, failure 
to gain user 
commitment, 
misunderstanding 
requirements, lack of 
adequate user 
involvement, failure to 








introduction of new 
technology, 
insufficient staffing, 
conflict between user 
Risk categorization 
framework based upon 
perceived level of 
control and perceived 
relative importance 
Risk Factors IS project   
Communications of the Association for Information Systems (Volume14, 2004) 1-28                                   25 
A General, but Readily Adaptable Model of Information Risk by S. Alter and S.A. Sherer 
departments 
[Keil et al., 2000]  Risk propensity, risk 
perception  
Model that considers 
the affect of risk 
propensity, level of sunk 
cost, and risk 
perception on 






IS project  
[Kemerer and 
Sosa, 1991] 
















Identification of  barriers 










[Kumar and Dissel, 
1996] 
 Economic, technical, 
socio-political 
Identification of risks in 







[Lee and Clark, 
1997] 
 Transaction risks Transaction risks are 







[Lyytinen et al., 
1998] 




among these  
Use a sociotechnical 
model of organizational 
change to classify risks 
– system, project, and 
management sources.  
Risk Factors 
(sources) 





[Lyytinen et al., 
1998] 




among these  
A contingent, contextual 
and multivariate view of 
software development 











[Mohan et al., 
1990] 
  Approach to minimize 
risk 
Not defined EIS project  
[Moynihan, 2002] 7 Unrealistic customer 





people on project 
goals, personal 
deficiencies on part of 
customer’s PM, user 
resistance, presence 
of hidden agendas, 
Coping with client –
based people problems 
requires explicitness, 
clarity, and formality 
Factors  IS project  
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nasty politics by 
customer 
[McFarlan, 1981] 3 Size, experience, 
structure 
Framework Exposure to 
consequences 
IS project  
[McComb and 
Smith, 1991] 




Risk Factors IS project  








Vertical control reduces 
performance risk and 
increases control over 
the process whereas 
horizontal coordination 
leads to flexible 
software applications. 
Performance risk 
mediates the effect of 
vertical coordination 
and requirements 
uncertainty on process 




IS project Mutual 
adjustments 
over time 








Performance risk is an 
alternative to fit that 
explains the effect of 
coordination and 
uncertainty on process 






















quality, impact on 
executive work, EIS 
functions, ease of use 
Rank ordered keys to 
successful development 




[Rainer et al., 1991] 22 Physical threats, 
unauthorized physical 
or electronic access, 
authorized physical or 
electronic access  
Risk analysis method 











  Two-stage contracting 
model for software 
design and 
development 




[Scott and Vessey, 
2002] 
26 Organizational 
context, IS context, 
project 
Risk factors in ERP 
implementations 
Risk Factors ERP project  








Authoritative list of 
common risk factors 
obtained from Delphi 
survey in 3 countries 
Risk Factors IS project   
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risk, success risk  
Identification of risk 
components from focus 
group 
Components IS project  







Approach that deals 
with problem that 
managers often lack 




[Viehland, 2002] 3 Competitive risk, 
transition risk, 
business partner risk 











balance of power, 
developing new 
products 
Framework to assess 
risks 







 Active failures, latent 
failures 
Conceptual model for 
managing system errors 
that distinguishes 
between active and 
latent failures 
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